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Introduction 
 
Just over three years ago the UK financial sector witnessed the rapid deterioration and failure of the 
Northern Rock Bank. Customers – savers – formed long queues outside the provincial and suburban 
offices of this former regional building society, de-mutualised in 1997 under the 1986 Building Society 
Act powers, serving to emphasise and visually illustrate the most significant and substantial run on a UK 
Bank for over 150 years. A little over two years ago Lehman Brothers filed for US Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
– with total pre-bankruptcy assets valued at almost $640 billion making it the largest bankruptcy in US 
financial history dwarfing the earlier touchstone of Corporate Governance failure, that of the Enron 
Corporation.  
 
Expressions of shock and disbelief littered the financial and business press – the Director-General of the 
Building Societies Association (BSA) noting at the time the episode had ‘been utterly, unbelievably, 
astonishing’1. For this particular sector, the Building Society ‘mutual’ sector, the backdrop of the 
previously noted 1986 Building Societies Act is significant: this recent period has seen the last remaining 
truly independent flag-bearer of the 1986 de-mutualisation process fail. 
 
The UK Government’s reaction has been to focus on the nature of the banking collapse, with the House 
of Commons Treasury Select Committee into the Banking Crisis2 identifying 2 key themes in relation to 
risk: 
 
 That risk and complexity within the banking sector had increased dramatically over the previous 
twenty years with a widespread, but often misguided belief that risk was being dispersed and 
‘managed’; 
 There had been a financial sector demonstrating significantly increased leverage, with those 
demonstrating the greatest appetite for rapid growth through leverage being amongst the 
heaviest casualties 
 
Two key reports have served to focus both the concerns and the future expectations of the broader 
financial service sector:   
 
a) The Financial Services Authority (FSA), through the Turner Report3, considered how to frame a 
regulatory response to the global banking crisis focusing on, amongst other areas, a new approach 
to regulation: designed to be ‘more intrusive and more systemic’. Importantly in relation to the focus 
of this work, the Turner Review has also suggested a seismic shift in the governing role of non-
executives, supporting greater challenge from a more professionalised body of Non Executive 
Directors (NEDs). 
 
b) Then the Government appointed Walker Review of Corporate Governance of UK Banking Industry4 
set out to consider and review ‘corporate governance in UK banks in the light of the experience of 
critical loss and failure throughout the banking system’ (Preface).  At the centre of its examination 
were a number of risk specific concerns: 
 
 Effectiveness of risk management at board level, including the incentives in remuneration 
policy to manage risk effectively  
 The effectiveness of board practices and the performance of audit, risk, remuneration and 
nomination committees 
The overall concern here has been that at the centre of the banking crisis was a mis-management of 
risk; and at the centre of the management of risk is the board, and more particularly the NED.  
                                                    
1
 BBC website article date September 29 2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7641925.stm [accessed June 5 2010] 
2
 House of Commons Treasury Committee Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision Fourteenth Report of Session 2008-09 July 
21st 2009 
3
 Turner Report (2009) A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis Financial Services Authority. Note also on June 16, 
2010, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, announced plans to abolish the FSA and separate its responsibilities 
between a number of new agencies and the Bank of England 
4
 Walker Review (2009) A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities HM Treasury 
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Against the wider concerns of the financial services sector, and the varied demise and disappearance of 
the ten5 former independent and de-mutualised building societies, a number of commentators found 
renewed interest in the building society mutual model.  For example, the formerly referred select 
committee considered building societies to have generally ‘operated a safer business model’6. The 
Building Societies Association sought to emphasise this relatively sound track record in its submission to 
the Walker Review in stating that what is recognised ‘are the shortcomings that have been evident in 
the quality of decision-making of board banks’ yet ‘building societies themselves have a good, and 
improving record on corporate governance’7.  
 
Whilst there have been exceptions, such as with the failings and part-failings of the Dunfermline and 
West Bromwich societies, building societies have generally been seen to manage their risks in a more 
cautious and balanced manner, reflecting their differing financial construction and legal framework but 
also their community (mutual) stakeholder concerns. The Oxford Centre for Mutual and Employee-
Owned Business identify three main reasons for this:  
 
1. Firstly, regulation limited the extent to which building societies could diversify into the areas 
(e.g. derivatives trading) that proved to be a serious problem for many banks.  
2. Secondly, their mutual status meant that they generally had a lower risk appetite irrespective of 
regulation.  
3. Thirdly, both by regulation and choice, building societies limited their dependence on wholesale 
funding markets and securitisation.8  
 
The central issues at the crux of this research project then are:  
 
 the interest in trying to establish how building society boards are currently viewing risk; 
 how the recent financial crisis has affected their risk perception, risk appetite and risk 
management; 
 both taken from the perspective of NEDs, who are increasingly seen to have a change of focus 
of their role and perhaps some significant changing expectations of their influence in controlling 
and directing financial institutions - in this case, building societies.   
 
A view may be that a more conservative risk policy will bear dividends in increased consumer confidence 
and wider government and regulatory satisfaction of the mutual business model, but an alternative 
perspective is that the risk pendulum may swing too far towards risk certainty and risk avoidance, with a 
loss of competitive edge as the recession recedes. Finally there is a question about how NEDs 
themselves view the recent proposals for a more emphasised role in the Corporate Governance of 
building societies.  
 
2. History and Profile of the UK Building Society Sector 
 
Building societies originally grew out of the friendly society movement of the late 18th century. Their 
development was very much linked to industrialisation and the need for housing for workers. 
Underpinned by a self-help ethos, the first examples9 were ‘terminating’ societies: members would agree 
to pay into the society, build houses together from the collected funds (allocating the first homes via 
lottery) until every member was housed at which point any surplus funds were distributed to the 
membership and the society terminated.  
 
The first ‘permanent’ society was formed in 1845 (The Metropolitan Equitable) and by 1890 there were 
2,579 societies10 in existence, with virtually every town and industrial centre having  its own society, as 
                                                    
5
 See Appendix 1 
6
 House of Commons Treasury Committee Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision Fourteenth Report of Session 2008-09 July 
21st 2009 
7
 BSA response to the Walker Review, June 2009 
8
 Oxford Centre for Mutual and Employee-Owned Business (2009) Converting failed financial institutions into mutual organisations 
BSA 
9
 The first recorded society was established in 1775 - Ketley's Building Society of Birmingham 
10
 Short J (1982) Housing in Britain pp121 -131  
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well as there being many work-based societies. During this early period societies generally remained 
very small but continuing rationalisation through mergers reduced the numbers to 481 in 1970 and 130 
by 198811. Their greatest period of growth was between 1955 and 1980 as mass owner-occupation took 
hold in UK society and in national housing policy, with building societies benefitting from an effective 
retail deposits oligopoly alongside UK banks.  
 
In line with wider de-regulation and privatisation of both public and regulated sectors, the 1986 Building 
Societies Act substantially widened the powers of societies in the field of housing and personal banking 
services. This also paved the way for the first ‘de-mutualisation’ of a building society: in 1989 Abbey 
National resolved to convert to plc, and bank status, and in July 1989 the Abbey National Bank PLC was 
formed.  The de-mutualisation process was most significantly implemented within larger societies such 
that by 1994, two-thirds of the total assets held within the building society sector until then had 
transferred out of the sector12. Having accounted for 80% of all residential loans in 1994, this figure fell 
rapidly to 25% by 1999. Now the building society sector holds just over 20% of UK retail deposits and 
has a little over 20% of the UK mortgage market.13  
 
The potential advantage for a mutual is easy to see. It has been recognised for some time that investor-
owned companies carry and indeed target a higher total risk than mutuals, with investor owned 
companies accepting riskier lines of business and working in geographical areas of high risk14. In any 
case, despite various relaxations in legislation and regulation, most notably the 1986 legislation, building 
societies are in effect ‘creatures of statute’, being only able to do those things they are allowed to do 
and only operating within the parameters established by parliament.  Building societies are therefore 
subject to a number of statutory limits15 which restrict the flexibility of their business model relative to 
banks.16 According to the FSA, these limitations are necessary to prevent societies from undertaking too 
much business in areas that are considered to be unduly risky. 
‘One of our supervisory aims is to reduce the risk of building societies failing or 
needing to enter rescue mergers, by improving the match between societies’ risk 
management processes and the risks associated with their chosen business models.’17 
 
Aside from the immediate and direct service provision available through building societies, a wider and 
very current consideration at Government level is the preservation and indeed encouragement of 
diversity in the financial services sector. As indicated earlier, there has been a continuing rationalisation 
within the building society sector for more than 150 years as well as the de-mutualisation losses from 
the sector so that there are now just 4918 independent building societies operating in the UK. The 
rationalisation process is not easy to reverse, with the Ecology Building Society being the only newly 
created society in recent years (established in 1981).  
 
The importance of diversity within the wider financial market has been recognised by many and the 
argument has been made for some time19 that a greater variety of financial institutions provides for 
increased stability in contrast to a much narrower concentration of such institutions. There is in any case 
a benefit derived from the consumer sovereignty and consumer choice in a competitive but diverse 
market. On this point, the government’s stated intention is to reinvigorate competition in the banking 
sector include ‘supporting competition and choice through diversity, most importantly through 
maintaining a strong mutually-owned financial sector’20. This may receive some impetus from the newly 
                                                    
11 Wells G E (1989) The revolution in Building Societies Long Range Planning 22 (5) pp 30-37 
12 Cook J et al (2001) Mutuality and Corporate Governance: the Evolution of UK Building Societies Following De-Regulation ESRC 
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 205  
13 FSA CP 2009/17 Sourcebook 
14
 Lamm-Tenant J and Starks L T (1993) ‘Stock versus mutual ownership structures: the risk implications’ Journal of Business Vol 
66 (1) pp 29-46 
15 The Building Societies Act 1986 requires at least 75% of society lending to be for mortgages secured on residential property, 
retail deposits to account for at least 50% of total funding and limits the use of derivatives. 
16 This again reflects the ‘more cautious and balanced’ approach to risk identified earlier from the work by the Oxford Centre for 
Mutual and Employee-Owned Business.  
17 FSA Sourcebook (2009) p.27 
18 Soon to be 48 with the technical re-constitution of Kent Reliance as an Industrial and Provident Society – see Appendix 2  
19 Llewellyn, D. T. & Holmes, M. J. (1991) ‘In Defence of Mutuality: A Redress to an emerging conventional Wisdom’ Annals of 
Public and Co-operative Economics, pp 319-354 
20 HM Treasury White Paper, Reforming Financial Markets, July 2009.   
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announced Independent Commission on Banking to be chaired by Sir John Vickers. Mr Osborne, in 
introducing the proposals for this commission expressed some further support for the Building 
Society/mutual sector(s)21:  
 
“building societies and mutuals have an important role to play in the future. We want to 
strengthen them and support those who want to create mutuals.” 
 
Yet without significant Government support, regulatory requirements for a healthy balance sheet and 
operational track record ‘make it virtually impossible to create a new society from scratch’22.  
The potential to do so from the re-constitution of the now state-owned Northern Rock does now present 
itself and this is the focus of the earlier report by the Oxford Centre for Mutual and Employee-Owned 
Business23. But one commentator has provided a cautionary note that ‘of course, any new mutual 
society will continue to face competitive pressures to act commercially’24.  
 
This historical perspective is provided to put the more recent events into some longer-term context, not 
least because the recent banking crisis, and the challenges that this brings for the building society 
sector, should not obscure some of the longer-term changes in the financial sector that have affected 
building societies. Without some significant shift in the policy arena the external pressures and dynamics 
that produced these original changes will presumably quickly re-surface and impact once again. These 
issues are returned to again in the final section. 
 
 
3. The Non Executive Director  
 
A Non-Executive Director (NED) is someone who has no significant interests or management 
responsibilities to a company or organisation other than that of being a director. A NED plays a key part 
in corporate governance and in the functioning and ethos of the unitary board. Their role has been 
endorsed and clarified in a series of corporate governance reviews and in a variety of sector specific 
policy guidelines and regulatory requirements.  
 
The Cadbury Report25 considered that NED’s should: 
   
‘bring an independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources, including 
key appointments, and standards of conduct … [and] the calibre and number of non-executive 
directors on a board should be such that their views will carry significant weight in the board’s 
decisions.’ 
 
The Higgs Report26 provided the most comprehensive review and advice on the role and responsibilities 
of the NED noting that as members of the unitary board, all directors are required to: 
• provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a 
framework of prudent and effective controls which enable risk to 
be assessed and managed; 
• set the company’s strategic aims and review management performance;  
• set the company’s values and standards  
 
In addition to these requirements for all directors, the role of the non executive director has the 
following key elements: 
 
• Strategy: NEDs should constructively challenge and contribute to the development of strategy. 
                                                    
21 House of Commons Debate – Financial Services Regulation – June 16 2010 
22 Leadbetter C and Christie (1999) To Our Mutual Advantage Demos 
23 eg Oxford Centre for Mutual and Employee-Owned Business (2009) Converting failed financial institutions into mutual 
organisations BSA 
24 Branston, R. et al. (2009) “Strategic Failure” and the case of the UK’s former building societies: Lessons for the reform of 
governance in the UK Banking Sector University of Bath: School of Management Working Paper p.102 
25 Cadbury Report (1992) The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
26 Higgs Report (2003) Review of The Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors Department of Trade and Industry 
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• Performance: NEDs should scrutinise the performance of management in meeting agreed 
goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of performance. 
• Risk: NEDs should satisfy themselves that financial information is accurate and that financial 
controls and systems of risk management are robust and defensible. 
• People: notably remuneration of executive directors and in appointing, and where necessary 
removing, senior management and in succession planning. 
  
 As part of the research team providing information and advice to the Higgs Review,  
McNulty T, et al27 identified the need for NEDS to consider both their strategic and control roles and the 
(potential) tensions and conflicts that may arise between these. More specifically they considered three 
behavioural dynamics expected from NEDs: 
 
• They should be engaged and non-executive; 
• They should challenge and support; 
• They should demonstrate independence and involvement. 
 
The Walker Review further focussed, amongst other issues, on the role of the NED with the expectation 
of evolution and development of current ‘best practice’ rather than radical change. It included a number 
of specific recommendations on the position of the NED in terms of their training and support and with 
regard to their need to provide challenge and control. This is considered further later in section 4 of this 
report.  
 
Earlier Governance reports, including the Cadbury Report and Higgs Review, have subsequently been 
incorporated within the more comprehensive and overarching guidance of the updated UK Corporate 
Governance Code 28. This forms the principle and fundamental source of advice on governance within 
both the UK Corporate world, but also as a baseline reference for guidance within a range of sectors and 
business areas 
 
Notwithstanding all of the above, the NED is in strictest terms, no different from an executive board 
member in holding the same fiduciary and governing responsibilities within a unitary board. But the 
reality of what an NED does and their role and remit, and the context in which NEDs ‘operate’ can be 
somewhat different.  
 
Empirical research by Hobeche and Garrow for the Roffey Institute29 concluded that: 
 
1. Effective governance may be at risk, as a result of: 
a. Boards being ‘risk-averse’ 
b. Board evaluation being of a ‘tick-box’ approach  
2. NED roles are still unclear, noting 
a. NED roles are increasingly onerous 
b. NED work requires ‘soft skills’ more than the previous Board or top management 
experience may alone imply 
3. There is a shrinking talent pool of NEDs, as 
a. The pool is drying-up 
b. Board diversity remains limited 
4. There is little help provided to new NEDs, in relation to induction and training 
 
Their report concluded that, post-Higgs and other reports, ‘board practices may be changing less quickly 
than recommended by Higgs et al’ and by inference the role of NED is both a challenging and 
challenged role in which individuals must apply themselves.   
 
                                                    
27 McNulty, T., Roberts, J. and Stiles, P. (2002) Creating accountability within the board: the work of the effective non-executive 
director: A Report for the Review of the Role and Effectiveness of the Non-Executive Director. London: Department of Trade and 
Industry. 
28
 i.e. the former Combined Code of Corporate Governance – originally published by the London Stock Exchange in 1998 with 
subsequent updates produced by the Financial Reporting (FRC) with the most recent update published in May 2010.  
29 Holbeche L and Garrow V (2005) The Rise of the Non-Executive Director Roffey-Park 
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4. Key Findings from the Turner Report and Walker Review 
 
Turner Report (2009) 
 
The Turner Review was undertaken by the Chair of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) at the behest 
of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in order to review and make recommendations for reforming UK and 
international approaches to the way banks are regulated. It identified three underlying causes of the 
crisis: macro-economic imbalances, faulty and misapplied financial innovation, and key deficiencies in 
bank capital and liquidity regulations.  These were further underpinned by an exaggerated faith in the 
concept of self-correcting markets.  
 
The Turner Review, reporting in March 2009, concluded that there needed to be a renewed concern for: 
 
 Fundamental changes in capital, liquidity and published accounts 
 Institutional and geographic coverage: economic substance not legal form 
 Other important changes: credit ratings, remuneration and counterparty risks 
 Macro-prudential analysis and the need for intellectual challenge 
 A new FSA approach to supervision: more intrusive and more systemic 
 Governance and risk management: firm responsibilities and structures 
 “Narrow banking” versus “investment banking”: major constraints but not complete separation? 
 Cross-border banks: more international cooperation and more national powers 
 
Ironically the FSA was also seen by the new incoming UK Government as part of the problem in itself 
and as a key element of the ‘tripartite agreement’ between the FSA, the Treasury and the central Bank 
of England which were considered to have ‘utterly failed’ both before and after the crisis according to 
the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. George Osborne: ‘The FSA became a narrow regulator, almost 
entirely focused on rules-based regulation.’30 In place of the former tripartite arrangement, the 
Government is to have a new Financial Policy Committee within the Bank of England, a Prudential 
Regulation Authority operating under the Bank of England, alongside a consumer focussed, but yet to be 
formally constituted, Consumer Protection and Markets Authority.  
 
Walker Review (2009) 
 
The Walker Review was published in November 2009 and provided 39 recommendations31 for change 
based on five broad areas: 
 
 Board size, composition and qualification – reference to board balance, knowledge and 
understanding; time commitment and dedicated support;  
 Functioning of the board and evaluation of performance – emphasising the role of NEDs 
in challenge, with increased expectations for the role of chairman and senior independent 
director (SID) and more generally in financial and board leadership experience; enhanced 
expectations in terms board appraisal and performance review; 
 The role of institutional shareholders: communication and engagement -  whilst less 
relevant to the building society sector, highlights further best practice from the revised 
Combined Code;  
 Governance of risk – the establishment of a Board Risk Committee supported by high-level 
direct reporting from a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), as well as other independent advice as 
necessary; 
 Remuneration – various detailed notes of recommendation on the review, form and 
performance expectations attached to remuneration packages especially that directed at “high 
end” employees 
                                                    
30
 Mansion House speech June 2010 
31
 The review was aimed principally at larger banks and financial institutions – Walker acknowledged that a calibrated approach 
was needed for smaller institutions and those with less complex business models. 
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These reports, their recommendations and general expectations, then became a central focus of the 
‘field’ research, as below. 
 
 
5. Research Plan and Methodology 
 
Focus and overall structure 
The focus of the research and the approach and scoping of the research methodology essentially took 
place in two parts: 
 
Phase 1:   
Initial outline questionnaires distributed to 52 building societies (reducing to 49 with subsequent 
mergers) requesting information from Company Secretaries and more specifically directed towards the 
Chair of Audit and one other NED. This was distributed via e-mail with support from the BSA in 
promoting responses and engagement.  
 
Questions were classified under four sections and focused on: 
 
Section One: Changes in the Competitive & Regulatory Environment 
 
a) Views on the Walker Review 
b) The overall competitive environment for Building Societies 
 
Section Two: Your Building Society and responses to change 
  
a) Perceptions of the Boards overall view of risk 
b) The embedding of risk management 
c) Changes in the governance structure and remuneration policy 
 
Section Three: Your role as an NED 
 
a) The general role and perception of the Board 
b) Training and preparedness for the role of NED 
c) Current confidence as NED 
 
And given the specific focus and form of financial service as defined by the ‘mutual’ label, Section Four 
was a single question seeking views and opinions on the ‘dividend of mutuality’ for the building society 
sector and the specific building society in question. 
 
Two societies did not return questionnaires but indicated a willingness to engage at Phase 2. The 
response rate for phase one was:  
 
 Substantial return (ie at least 1 NED fully completed questionnaire) = 13 societies (27%) 
 Others confirming willingness to participate in stage 2 = 2 Societies (4%) 
 Confirmed to be not participating = 4 Societies 
 
The response rate, at a combined total of 31% was therefore slightly lower than that expected of 
around 35-40%. Significantly, but perhaps as might be expected, it is the smaller Societies (ie those 
with assets of less than c. £350m) that have been less inclined to respond.  
 
Phase 2:  
This was based on a series of one-to-one interviews of NEDs to provide a further informed perspective 
on key issues and concerns. Our initial target sample here was between 16 and 20 in total, stratified 
according to Peer Group classifications. Our completed profile was slightly short of this with the 
completed interviews profiled as: 
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 Peer Group 1: Asset size over £1bn – 5 completed  
 Peer Group 2: Asset size of between £400m and £1bn – 5 completed  
 Peer Group 3: Asset size of less than £400m – 4 completed  
 
The range of Society types, location and range of products is, in our view, a reasonable reflection of the 
full range of Societies although we consider some further benefit may have derived from a further niche 
market Society representation (geographically or by focus).  
 
 
6. Research Responses And Commentary 
 
The summary responses here are provided in respect of each question taken from the original 
questionnaire, which then became the focus of more detailed discussions within the interview stage. 
With each question was provided a short preamble to help indicate the main areas of concern and, in 
part at least, the rationale for the inclusion of the question. The preamble is shown under each question 
in italics.  
 
 
Section One: Changes in the Competitive & Regulatory Environment 
 
Q1 Views on the Walker Review 
 
The Walker Report provided a wide-ranging review of the Corporate Governance of UK Banking 
Industry. The findings and the implications are still being digested in many institutions and 
organisations. Here we are interested in receiving NEDs overall assessment of the value of the report to 
the wider Building Society sector and the reasons why they are of this view. 
 
The responses in the initial questionnaire were predominantly favourable towards the Walker Review, 
with 20 of the 24 responses confirming a positive view of the value of the Report. One respondee 
indicated very favourable support and 3 holding a negative view.  
 
Comments favourably supporting Walker included: 
 
‘The Review encourages further challenge by NEDs but also emphasises the need for more training 
and support from within the organisation’ 
 
‘Requirements for and role of Board Risk Committee’  
 
‘Emphasises longer term rewards and claw-back provisions’ 
 
‘it should encourage more detailed scrutiny of risks’ 
 
‘it indicates and reinforces the time commitment necessary in the NED role’ 
 
‘At least the Review is sensible and balanced!’ 
 
Areas of concern noted included: 
 
‘Enhanced corporate governance can help in raising standards of decision-making and risk 
management but is no panacea and has to be seen in the context of a wider approach that includes 
effective supervision … of those pursuing riskier business models and those of sufficient size to be of 
systemic importance’ 
 
 ‘Too strong an adherence to every aspect will create either too large a board or, a board of 55-65 
year old males with banking/financial services experience alone’ 
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‘There is a danger that, if handled in the wrong way, the relationship of ED and NED becomes 
confrontational and moves away from being a unitary board’ 
 
‘It may be interpreted by some in too prescriptive a way – too much “one size fits all” – with a tick 
box interpretation of what makes a good board’ 
 
‘The danger is that Boards go for ‘safe’ options in appointing NEDs: high profile ‘names’, ex-CEOs of 
large Corporations, who might well be part of the problem’ 
 
Perhaps the most strongly worded and unfavourable response was that, for the smaller financial 
institution, the Review suggests: 
 
‘It’s overkill, and in danger of throwing the babies out with the bathwater!’ 
 
Q2 The overall competitive environment for Building Societies 
 
Through the financial crisis there has been some evidence of renewed interest and support for the 
Mutual model, but there has at the same time been the high-profile failure of the Dunfermline Building 
Society and problems experienced at the West Bromwich Building Society. The competitive landscape is 
still in some flux and over the short-term it might be expected that there will be a period of reflection 
and a focus on stabilisation for many across the wider financial services sector. Here we are interested 
in NED views over the short to medium term – say the next 12 to 18 months – and the balance of 
threats and opportunities facing the Building Society sector.  
 
The responses in the initial questionnaire were predominantly pessimistic, as perhaps might be expected 
in the current/recent climate. So 17 of the 24 responses identified more threats than opportunities in the 
business environment. Then 5 respondents identified significantly more threats than opportunities and 
just one seeing predominantly more opportunities. One respondee failed to provide a clear answer.  
 
Some of the challenges identified included: 
 
‘Interest rates are so low it’s almost impossible to trade profitably’ 
 
‘Margins being squeezed and there’s an unlevel playing field, especially with Government backed 
financial institutions.’ 
 
‘The new capital requirements and liquidity management regimes are draconian for the smaller 
society.’ 
 
‘(Some) reputational issues for the sector [ref: to Dunfermline] and perhaps FSA sees sector as part 
of the problem not part of the solution?’ 
 
‘Payments to FSCS!!’ 
 
‘Core markets are fractured: savings and mortgage markets both down.’ 
 
‘Public sector retreat/cut-backs.’ 
 
‘Major focus on PLC financial interests, including Governments.’ 
‘Excess and at times inappropriate regulation. Also availability of suitable NEDs to match regulatory 
expectations.’ 
 
‘Regulatory ‘pendulum’ has swung too far.’ 
 
‘Very tight managerial/administrative costs against market % levels.’ 
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‘The Building Society model is under severe stress … we’re really just treading water until interest 
rates rise.’ 
 
‘If Nationwide ever went to a bank, other large ones would be likely to follow and the sector could 
all but disappear.’ 
 
‘The FSA Sourcebook is an attack on mutuals – the FSA have an agenda and its to reduce the 
number of mutuals.’ 
 
‘View going around that Regulator wants ‘Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs’ [ie Nationwide plus 
seven large regionals].’ 
 
Views on the potential opportunities included: 
 
‘Focus on mortgages as a core product – “stick to the knitting”, emphasising community benefits 
alongside housing needs/requirements’ 
 
‘We are a niche player with an attractive brand that has customer trust and confidence – far more 
so than the banks.’ 
 
‘Good customer service and branch network – public need for local identity and allegiance.’ 
 
‘Trust in the sector and in the individual brands.’ 
 
‘Varied routes to market using modern technology reaching out to willing customers.’ 
 
‘Aggressive marketing of mutual concept and mutual model – establish benefit of diverse service 
provision for customer choice.’ 
 
‘Further rationalisation … Inevitably further mergers in the sector leading to fewer, but stronger, 
societies going forward.’ 
 
‘Great potential in sharing costs, perhaps even cross-mutuals, if we can only make it happen!’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section One Overview  
 
In summary what was identified as key issues with regard to the Walker Review were: 
 
a) The need for proportionality in applying the key elements of the Walker Review. 
It is felt that the main target of the Review is the larger financial institution and 
some recommendations may incur disproportionate management costs for 
smaller Building Societies; 
b) The intensified emphasis on NEDs coming from financial backgrounds, indeed 
having detailed financial services experience, would be detrimental to the retail 
business focus and mutual ethos of the sector. NEDs felt that a continuing need 
for board diversity was important and evident in discussions; 
c) The key remains the human element, both for the individual appointee in how 
they go about their activities as an NED, and how the Board act and undertake 
their tasks as a collective. In the end, how to challenge in a positive and effective 
way cannot be prescribed. 
 
Looking at the competitive environment:  
 
d) The current status is pre-dominantly one of ‘weathering the storm’.  
e) A continuing challenge for NEDs is in promoting entrepreneurial activity and 
encouraging the pursuit of (appropriate) opportunities.  
 
These issues are returned to in the summary review – section 7 of this report.   
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Section Two: Your Building Society and responses to change 
 
Q3 Perceptions of the Boards overall view of risk 
 
A key focus and concern for all of the recent reports, reviews and discussion has been the prevailing 
risk culture of the financial services industry. It is true that this is easier to discuss than determine, but 
risk culture is concerned not just with what happens but how risk is perceived and considered: the 
acknowledgement and promotion of constructive questioning and challenge throughout the 
organisation but especially at Board level. We are interested here in NED views about their current risk 
culture – most specifically the risk appetite and risk taking behaviour - and any perceived changes in 
response to various reports (e.g. the Walker report).  
 
The focus was on identifying if there was a concern about being more or less risk averse.  4 answers 
indicated a concern about being less risk averse and 1 significantly concerned. 9 were concerned about 
being more risk averse and 1 significantly so, with 5 a balanced view. Clearly the level of concern 
expressed is itself determined by where a NED believes their society currently sits and in which direction 
risk may shift. This question produced a variety of additional comments and we present here more 
individual quotations for illustration:    
 
‘Yes, there has been a shift in risk appetite – and for the better. My concern as a NED would be us 
becoming less risk averse as we come out of the recession and “being tempted” to take greater 
risks.’ 
 
‘I worry that excessive concentration on obvious existing risks will reduce the chance of identifying 
the next big challenge to come along OR reduce the chances of us taking up profitable 
opportunities.’  
 
‘The need to understand and handle the Capital Requirements Directives (CRD) meant the game 
changed for NEDs – we needed to gear up to a more sophisticated approach.’ 
 
‘We’ve always been risk averse, but gradually less so. I’d say we’re simply more risk aware and 
know that we’ll need to take more risk in some areas, but hopefully in a carefully managed way.’ 
 
‘Over the year we’ve sought to maintain and attract high quality mortgage business – modest Loan 
to Value (LTV) rates, affordability criteria, specialist underwriting on a case-by-case basis – we’re 
determined not to compromise our quality criteria.’ 
 
‘Our BS has consistently operated a risk averse model and moved very cautiously up the risk curve 
BUT we can see that the current culture (eg reflecting Walker etc) might make this too extreme and 
restrict opportunities.’ 
 
‘XY has always adopted a risk averse attitude … recently we’ve tightened our lending criteria but 
have raised our average LTV a little given lower house prices.’  
 
‘We hope to keep within our current risk profile but some relaxation may be necessary, but this 
would be limited and gradual.’ 
 
‘On balance I guess we’re more risk averse but that’s appropriate and not a point of concern: we’ve 
tightened our underwriting criteria and substantially withdrawn from commercial lending (but will re-
engage when appropriate).’ 
 
‘Traditionally we’ve been at the lower end of risk and don’t want to be even more risk averse than 
we already are – business is about taking risks and profits are the only way open to us to replenish 
capital.’ 
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‘Secured business lending and buy-to-let virtually frozen BUT in our heartland, through local 
branches (where we know the property market well), we’ve increased some LTV to first time 
buyers.’ 
 
‘The Board has generally taken a prudent stance on risk. Our risk appetite hasn’t changed but 
there’s a heightened awareness of the need to manage different risks and their (potential) 
consequences.’ 
 
‘NEDs are demanding more detail, more reassurance, but we might drown the strategic issues in the 
detail if we are not careful.’   
 
 ‘We’ve gone back to basics and are focussed entirely on prime residential lending for new business.’    
 
‘We’re getting better at assessing and managing risk – better at appropriate pricing for a given risk.’ 
 
‘We don’t have an ego … we’re not seeking to be the biggest or a ‘name’, we just want to do good 
business that suits our needs. If we’re careful with our lending assessment, based on good 
knowledge, we can move further.’ 
 
‘We’ve been too conservative in the past and couldn’t survive so we’ve had to address some risk 
issues (pre-Walker) and our risk-taking behaviour is now gathering pace, becoming a nimbler 
business.’ 
 
‘It (risk) has absorbed much Board attention. We’ve had to do rapid catch on risk assessment 
techniques. We are more risk averse but do now review our risk appetite more often.’   
 
‘We were risk averse and are more so now. ED’s are swamped by stress testing which is often 
disproportionate to the benefits it gives.’  
 
‘We need the reintroduction of a Glass-Steagal32 type separation of all different financial institutions 
and associated risk’  
 
 
Q4 The embedding of risk management 
 
The board is dependent on the quality of information it receives: ‘quality’ including issues such as 
relevance, timeliness, focus and scope, and overall critical incisiveness. In a recent report on the wider 
financial services sector Deloittes noted that ‘the lack of effective challenge arose from defective 
information flows, inadequate risk analysis and interpretation’. Management reports provide the means 
for board member to apply and demonstrate their application of critical challenge and facilitate (or 
hinder) high-quality decision-making by boards. Internal reporting is also a primary activity determining 
the ultimate quality of external reporting. Here we are interested in NED views on the quality of internal 
reporting in support of the NED role and whether the importance of Board reporting is embedded in the 
organisation.  
 
Responses to the questionnaire tended to produce a profile of satisfaction with the internal reporting 
processes: just one NED noted some noticeable inconsistencies, making internal challenge more difficult. 
Another provided an inconclusive response. Of the remaining 22 responses, 10 noted effective internal 
reporting and 12 very effective reporting. It is acknowledged that this is in itself inconclusive, but still 
interesting in that it may yet indicate either safe, secure and effective internal reporting and Board 
scrutiny, or a continuing difficulty for NEDs in assessing if they are indeed aware of, and receive reports 
on all the relevant critical issues. The detailed commentary in the questionnaire and in interviews did 
however provide further insight: 
 
‘There were some inconsistencies but much resolved now, and the setting up of an ALCO to 
support the Board was a good step forward.’ 
                                                    
32
 Glass-Steagal Act 1932 (US) 
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‘The Executive Risk Committee now report though Audit, so there’s greater comfort and 
challenge.’ 
 
‘We’ve monthly reporting of KPI’s with exceptions and action plans.’ 
 
‘There’s a very open management culture with a commitment to improvement: we can see that 
internal management information needs further work and that’s happening.’ 
 
‘We are reliant on key people for MI with no rotation of people as we’re quite small.’ 
 
‘Stress testing and scenario planning greatly improved with more active and engaged debate 
around these.’ 
 
‘Focused reports with extensive KPI review – reporting generally overhauled in 2008 with Board 
Risk Committee and other changes improving quality and depth of information flow.’ 
 
‘Credit risk reporting very well established – funding, liquidity and profitability reporting only just 
catching up “post-crisis”.’ 
 
‘Committee packs better organised and structured and ALCO improving with “maturity ladder”. 
Still can be a challenge “seeing the wood for the trees” in detailed reporting.’ 
 
‘Some management information reports are still problematic but the new Audit Manager led to 
step-change in reporting and discussion at Audit Committee.’ 
 
‘Improved Internal Audit (IA) reports and shared use of IA with another mutual has provided 
cross-learning. But we’ve also learned some absence of problems is due to good management 
of process by individual staff rather than comprehensive procedures etc. which needs 
addressing.’ 
 
‘The Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) and ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ 
approach are much improved – better overview of all business rather than separate business 
streams. Reflects more focussed management/organisational structure.’ 
 
‘The problem is that most organisations get into difficulty because “risk is too difficult to call”.’ 
 
Q5 Changes in the governance structure and remuneration policy 
 
The Turner Review questioned whether changes in governance structures are required to increase the 
independence of risk management functions. The Walker Review itself recommends further 
consideration of governing roles and responsibilities including the formation of a Board Risk Committee 
(BRC) and an enhanced status for the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) – both being seen as ‘structural enablers’ 
of effective risk management33. Here we are interested in their society’s responses to these 
recommendations and their views on the relative importance and support for structural change. Given 
the public and political focus on executive remuneration across financial services sector, we also asked a 
specific question regarding the interaction of the remuneration committee with other committees. 
 
From both the Company Secretary and the NED Questionnaires, the following changes were noted 
within the research sample: 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
33
 FSA CP 2010/3: Effective Corporate Governance. Essentially stated that each building society needs to consider its own risk 
controls – and whether they need a Board Risk Committee and a senior Risk Officer  
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Relevant Change Introduced Comment 
Senior Independent 
Director 
1  
Chief Risk Officer 4 1 - now reporting to Board direct 
1 – currently reviewing with intention 
to implement 
1 – indicated incorporated with FD role 
Board Risk Committee 
(BRC) 
5 3 – no requirement for BRC at this time 
3 – included as Audit & Risk  
1 – currently reviewing proposals for 
change 
Remuneration Policy 
and/or Structure 
3 2 – currently reviewing proposals for 
change 
 
‘We’re too small to warrant a separate CRO.’ 
 
‘The scope to have a dedicated CRO is limited.’ 
 
‘We don’t think we need a separate BRC, the task is incorporated very efficiently in our Audit & Risk 
Committee’ 
 
‘The society is not involved in non-standard products and bonus levels are both generally limited 
and focussed on risk management rather than financial performance per se.’ 
 
‘Bonus deferral is already under discussion, but to note that recent governance proposals assume 
that variable pay (ie bonus) can be made as ‘non-cash’ and/or easily deferred – this is more difficult 
where equity (shares) is not available and the current climate demands short-term survival as much 
as consideration of long-term risks.’ 
 
‘Some changes in remuneration but tinkering rather than anything wholesale – not seen as a major 
issue with some longevity amongst senior Exec. They’ve been in for the long haul!’ 
 
‘If we had a more complex business model I could perhaps see the point of a BRC – but we don’t.’ 
 
‘In a small organisation people need to wear more than one hat, so a separate CRO is pretty 
unlikely.’ 
 
‘More significant issue is: “does Risk get sufficient space at the Board – that’s the challenge.’ 
 
‘We have a simple business model – CRO not necessary and simply unaffordable for many Building 
Societies.’ 
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Section Three: Your role as an NED 
 
Q6 The general role and perception of the NED 
 
Advice on Board Governance has consistently emphasised the need for effective independent critical 
review and oversight, and the role of the NED should be central to this process. This has again been 
noted in the Walker Review with a number of proposals and recommendations to support this. In 
practice Board Governance can be undermined and the NED role diminished by a strong executive team.  
The Institute for Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) for instance, in responding to the 
Walker consultation, questioned whether steps were needed to encourage boards to understand that 
they are ‘one step down’ from the owners rather than ‘one step up’ from the executive management. 
Here we are interested in NED views on their current role and their perception of others about their role. 
 
There was a very clear feeling amongst NED respondents that their position was both emphasised and 
supported within the Board. 12 respondents indicated this was strongly the case and the other 10 
considering it very strongly so. As can be seen from the more detailed commentary this endorsement is 
Section Two Overview  
 
In summary what was identified as key issues with regard to current risk appetite and risk 
management were: 
 
a) For some the crisis had produced a re-assertion, a re-affirmation, of traditional prudent 
approaches – often described in terms of a focus on (traditional) residential lending 
within modest and quite prescribed lending policies (e.g. in terms of Loan to Value (LTV). 
b) For others there was a reflection on how best to manage or balance the risk appetite as 
the recession recedes – how, and to what extent, the risk approach may return to 
equilibrium (i.e. business as usual). 
c) A concern for some was the recognition that their business was already relatively risk-
averse.  The question then was how to identify and develop opportunities that both 
reflect core values, but support positive business development that suits the customer 
base and membership.       
d) Most identified a more developed and focused risk awareness and structured risk-
assessment (often evidenced in references to a wider application of various risk-
assessment techniques).  
e) Most identified a strengthening of the risk management process, the embedding of risk, 
further into the organisation, often noting that the simpler business and organisational 
structure made risk, and risk decision-making, more transparent.  
f) Overall there was some feeling of enhanced confidence, having worked through the peak 
of the crisis without significant damage, and having seen some relative endorsement of 
‘their approach’.   
 
In terms of governance structures and remuneration issues: 
 
a) The general response was that some minor fine-tuning had been taking place, but some 
of the core recommendations (of a Board Risk Committee and a Chief Risk Officer) were 
not to be voluntarily adopted as a matter of course. This is in line with Walker and 
Turner reviews both of which acknowledge that BRCs and CROs are not necessary 
elements within smaller, less complex financial institutions 
b) Most NEDs saw the issue of both the scale and form of executive remuneration as of less 
relevance and concern to the sector – executive directors cannot benefit from company 
shares as such and the focus is really on stakeholders perceived fairness e.g. 
comparisons to general staff remuneration and annual ‘settlements’. 
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derived from both internal reflections but also the external governance environment as outlined in 
formal reports such as the Walker Review. Nevertheless there are, as can be seen, still some areas of 
concern regarding the wider understanding and appreciation of the role of an NED.  
 
Comments included: 
 
‘Our role is to represent the members’ interests and provide challenge, guidance and support to 
the executive in their responsibilities.’ 
 
‘Clear response to NED challenge and queries.’  
 
‘In my earlier experiences in smaller societies, I was concerned that NEDs acted as “quasi-
executives”, which is clearly not our role. Much better in recent years with a clear recognition of 
our oversight role.’ 
 
‘Remember – in a mutual NEDs carry out the only oversight which exists as they are no owners 
to oversee the board.’  
 
‘Execs realise and appreciate NEDs are “critical friends”.’ 
 
‘Our ARROW (Advanced Risk-Responsive Operating FrameWork) results provide positive of our 
contribution.’  
 
‘It’s not easy to find good NEDs who have the time available and, where they still have exec 
roles, to make the switch to behaving as a NED.’ 
 
‘I just wonder how people can hold several NED roles … maybe this should be prescribed?’ 
 
A number of respondees gave examples and case illustrations of how and where they had applied and 
asserted their influence in key decisions and policy/strategy interventions some of which remain 
confidential within the project team34.  
 
NEDs were also asked if they had seen any change in role or perception during 2009: 
 
‘There’s an increased awareness of the importance and responsibility of the (NED) role in the 
society and as a representative of the greater community.’ 
 
‘The Walker Review has certainly increased awareness of the NED’s qualifications, role and 
responsibilities.’ 
 
‘More active support for NED learning and development.’ 
 
‘The demands on those NEDs with real financial services experience are increasing considerably 
…. But the NED expertise on brand, customer service etc. is just as important.’ 
 
‘I am concerned about the trend of external regulation negatively affects NEDs. NEDs should not 
just be “policemen” – they should contribute to strategy formation and related decision-making. 
We need to hold on to the spirit of being a unitary board.’ 
 
‘Our exposure to staff and to members could be improved – staff perceive that NEDs are 
removed from the business.’ 
 
‘NEDs come into their own in times of strife … [such as in recent past].’ 
 
                                                    
34
 Some of these were undoubtedly of great strategic significance, but due to the confidentiality of the research cannot be detailed 
here.  
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‘More aware of personal responsibility, especially if FSA go after individuals. Its at the forefront 
of our minds!’ 
 
‘I think the (Walker) review and formal review goes against the culture of the Board we are 
trying to create here – more headteacher role and not the appropriate style for us.’ 
 
‘Changes in the external world have emphasised the NED role, but much of this is at Board level 
and understanding lower down the organisation is lacking. We need to engage more with staff 
as well as members.’ 
 
Q7 Training and preparedness for the role of NED 
 
It has long since been recognised that, to be effective, NEDs need suitable training (induction and 
ongoing) and material support. This has been extended in terms of requiring NED involvement in and 
chairing of key committees, and in growing expectations for board renewal and board appraisal/review. 
More specifically the Walker Review outlined recommendations for more extensive time commitments 
from NEDs to meet their extended responsibilities. Here we are interested in NED views on what was 
provided to assist with your preparedness for Board work and views on current and projected time 
commitments.  
 
This was divided into two sub-questions: the preparedness for the role and secondly the projected time 
commitments as an NED.  
 
Some found themselves well prepared for their role: 13 reported well designed induction and training 
and support with another 5 seeing some evidence of the same. But there were also 4 others who 
reported only modest preparation for their NED role. In terms of time commitment, 3 found it much 
more of a commitment than expected and another 16 more than expected. Only 3 found it as expected 
or less.  
 
Comments were focussed on any changes in the NED preparedness since 2009 as well as more general 
views on induction and training: 
 
‘Bigger Board packs and more complex issues, all requiring analysis and comment.’ 
 
‘More quality reports – we’re all more aware of our responsibilities and our performance being in 
the spotlight.’ 
 
‘Increased requirement for understanding trading areas of the business (ALCO).’ 
 
‘Time commitment probably increased by 2-3 times from I when started and will increase again 
next year (2010).’ 
 
‘Increased time inevitably reflects response to the crisis and the complexity of the regulatory 
changes that have ensued.’ 
 
‘Time and the level of scrutiny will deter some candidates, so we may have a shortage of quality 
NEDs in the future.’ 
 
‘Increased oversight/review by FSA.’ 
 
‘Fees must be set to reflect demands on NEDs in the future ..’ 
 
‘We are revamping our induction and ongoing training in the near future.’ 
 
‘There’s a longer lead in time now with FSA approval … this and general increased time 
commitment will mean the recruitment pool is likely to be retired persons.’   
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‘We need people from within but also external to the sector (fresh faces, fresh minds) but 
there’s a lot of sector terminology/jargon to come to terms with for new NEDs.’ 
 
‘NED remuneration must increase if the inputs/outputs can be delivered. Smaller mutuals may 
find it even more difficult to compete from a limited pool of potential NEDs – especially if HQ is 
away from London.’ 
 
‘Real challenge for Board/Committee Chairs, and for “Senior Independents”.’ 
 
‘NEDs are becoming scarce animals.’ 
 
 
Q8 Current confidence as NED 
 
Here we are simply asking if, in the light of the widespread focus on the financial crises and general 
Board governance, this has impacted on NEDs confidence in their effectiveness and/or that of their 
fellow NEDs.   
 
This was again divided into two sub-questions: confidence in the NEDs own role and then in the full NED 
complement on the Board. For the most part NEDs felt more confident in their role: 1 reported much 
increased confidence and another 16 some increased confidence. 3 were ‘balanced’ in their review and 1 
less confident. For the second element, 15 reported much increased confidence in the NED presence on 
the Board and another 4 some increased confidence. 3 were balanced and 1 indicated a reduced 
confidence in the NEDs within the Board.   
 
Comments with the questionnaire were quite limited, but the interviews brought out some further detail 
and insight: 
 
‘Events in 2009 acted as a ‘test’ and accelerated developments already underway’ 
 
‘We are at risk of seeing ourselves as a separate (business) form, whereas we need the calibre 
and experience appropriate to the banking sector.’ 
 
‘No real change in confidence either for myself or for my colleagues.’ 
 
‘Over the past 5 years the Board has sought to adopt appropriate strategies that are risk-based  
… and to anticipate the requirements of the FSA and other parties that oversee the Society.’ 
 
‘The FSA could have engaged NEDs much earlier in 2007/08 in the wake of the crisis …’ 
 
‘I don’t think my confidence level has changed, but we have probably all learned a few lessons.’ 
 
‘Board confidence has increased collectively as well as at the individual level. We’ve had some 
previous decisions and strategies endorsed by some of the recent events.’ 
 
‘The element of challenge has increased but also some evidence of better collective working 
within/across the Board and with wider Executive.’   
 
‘It feels better, more confident BUT NEDs must be prepared to step down if their independence 
compromised – this just doesn’t happen enough in the business world.’ 
 
‘More confident having navigated through the difficulties with good results.’ 
 
‘Still feel we are compressed by regulation and it tends to makes us look backwards, when the 
fun bit is looking forward!’  
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Section Four: The ‘dividend of mutuality’ 
 
An important focus for building societies is on the need to continue to identify and demonstrate the 
benefits that mutuality confers, both to the member but also the wider range of key stakeholders. This 
has been described in various circles as the ‘dividend of mutuality’. Here we are interested in NED views 
about what this means from their own perspective and with regard to their individual society. Here we 
used some commonly identified measures or indicators of mutuality. 
 
This was in many respects an opportunity for the NEDs to reflect more widely on the Building Society 
sector and its business rationale and unique selling point(s). The overall response profile is tabulated 
below, but as with other questions, the insight is delivered in some of the questionnaire and interview 
responses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section Three Overview  
 
In summary what we have identified is: 
 
a) There is wide spread support and endorsement of the fundamental unitary board 
model and the contribution that NEDs make within the BSoc sector; 
b) There has been an increased concern and focus on both induction processes and 
ongoing training for NEDs; 
c) Many NEDs and board seem more confident in their individual and perhaps more 
specifically, the collective abilities and application of their colleague NEDs and boards 
having survived the initial challenges of the recession. 
 
There are however areas of concern and pointers for further reflection: 
 
d) Whilst the role and remit of the NED is understood within the Board, there are 
concerns that it is less well understood either by other key stakeholders both 
internally and externally; 
e) Many NEDs feel both uncomfortable, and in some instances more fundamentally 
concerned, that their role is being framed ever more within the monitoring and 
‘watchdog’ role rather than the strategy/control duality identified in the earlier 
literature material; 
f) The NED appears to becoming ever more onerous and the time requirements and 
general involvement may increase the cost of NED appointments and reduce further 
the potential future recruitment pool; 
g) Related to the above, and to the Walker Review expectations, there were also 
concerns that an increased weekly/even daily contribution may ‘incorporate’ them 
further into the organisation and organisational culture and blur the very 
independence of the NED; 
h) There is a seeming resistance to formal appraisal, and little evidence of external, 
independent advice being sought or even considered in the way envisaged by Walker, 
beyond the usual internal/external audit support. NEDs need to consider periodically 
the benefits of greater exposure to external perspectives to prevent too insular an 
approach. 
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Key indicator Number of times ranked highest or 
joint highest in questionnaire 
response 
Democratic Engagement with Members 12 
Keener Pricing Policies (without 
shareholder dividend) 
7 
Member Friendly Practices 13 
Longer Term Policies and Commitments  13 
Mutual Culture 17 
 
Further comments made were many and varied: 
 
‘We emphasise our mutuality by putting people before profit, and by ensuring that our profit is 
sufficient to grow the society – a good balancing act if we can get it right!’ 
 
‘we need to maintain simple effective mutual values in support of a core objective – affordable 
home ownership.’ 
 
‘Our objective is to remain a local, independent mutually owned building society and we have no 
intention of living beyond our means by offering products we cannot afford’ 
 
 ‘To survive in the long-term mutuals must be given a fair and level playing field on which to 
operate. There appears to be little or no effort on behalf of various authorities [sic] to put things 
right despite warm words about mutuality’ 
 
‘It is important that the mutual model continues as an alternative to conventional business, 
especially in financial services where public trust has taken such a knock.’ 
 
‘It’s a matter of frequent discussion, usually prompted by NEDs, but it’s not fully understood by 
members and more could be made of it.’ 
    
A frequent point made was that internally, from the executive through to front line staff, NEDs did feel 
that there was a very positive sense of being different, providing a more community conscious and 
focused business offer. NEDs were very much aware however of the difficulty in making this connect 
with the membership and even more so with the wider public: 
 
‘Its an easy thing to talk about, but much harder to demonstrate and deliver.’ 
 
‘We feel we have a very sound (potential) USP in being the only serious high street competitor to 
the banks, but we find it very difficult to communicate this USP to existing/prospective (mutual) 
members’ 
 
‘I think the concept of mutuality is very confused in the building society sector, and possibly 
becoming more so. We need to start from the customer perspective and what mutuality can do for 
them, not the other way around.’ 
 
‘I’ve always been impressed by the significant regard paid to mutuality in general and members in 
particular and this isn’t the treatment some shareholders receive from PLC … BUT … until the 
current stresses are relieved and lending can once again become a viable reality, the concept [of 
mutuality] is destined to become a dinosaur’ 
 
‘Mutuality is a state of mind for a business, but one not fully understood, or of immediate concern to 
the public. But they do understand different behaviour, and we are starting a journey to try to 
reinforce the mutual ‘difference’ in a way that might also appeal to a younger membership.’ 
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7.  Summary Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The research has identified a series of views related to the three main areas of investigation:  
 
1. What has been identified with regard to the Walker Review is: 
 
a) The need for proportionality in relation to the operational context and requirements of 
Building Societies, especially the smaller ones; 
b) A concern of over-emphasising the financial background of NEDs when NEDs identified a 
continuing need for board diversity; 
c) The key remains the human element and how boards work together. Here NEDs seem to 
endorse the view that ‘the key to better corporate governance lies … in the social dynamics 
of board interaction, and in the competence, integrity, and constructive involvement of 
individual directors’35 
 
Looking at the competitive environment the current status was pre-dominantly one of ‘weathering the 
storm’, with NEDs expressing circumstances in the ‘here and now’ rather than over a longer period, or 
even medium term. This point is also identified in the next section.   
 
2. Considering recent response to change and perspectives on risk, our research indicates: 
 
a) A feeling of being better informed and equipped to consider and assess and manage risk in 
a focused and systematic way; 
b) Notwithstanding the above, a reluctance to adopt some of the organisational and structural 
changes envisaged by Walker (Chief Risk Officer; Board Risk Committee) either as a result 
of these being seen to be less relevant to the building society business model and/or 
financially challenging especially for the smaller societies – this, as noted earlier is within the 
expectations of Turner and Walker Reviews; 
c) Clear indications of a risk-averse sector or at least a desire to express a concern and a 
status in which ‘risk security’ was paramount, with some evidence that this was becoming 
more ingrained not just as a result of external scrutiny but as an expression of internal 
policy intent; 
d) A view that the focus on executive remuneration was also less relevant with the sector 
where shareholder bonuses do not exist. NEDs generally felt it was an exaggerated concern 
in this sector. 
 
A challenge for NEDs in assessing risk is in considering the ‘up-side’ of risk i.e. in promoting and 
encouraging entrepreneurial activity. Deloittes review of the Building Society Sector36 considered how 
building societies are approaching the ‘weathering of the storm’ noted earlier, outlining a three stage 
approach to expectation management. Deloitte’s view is that ‘Redefinition to deliver long term value will 
require focus on multiple improvement levers over a multi-year period – underpinned by effective 
management of market expectations’ (Deloitte 2009).  
 
This is summarised graphically as in Figure 1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
35 Nadler, D. (2004) ‘Building better boards’ Harvard Business Review May 2004, p.102 
36 Deloitte (2009) Building Society Sector: A Perspective. Seminar presentation December 2009, made available in private 
communication. 
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Figure 1: Building Society Sector Review – Projected Business Environment (Deloitte 2009) 
 
 
 
 
Our research evidence is that NEDs have mentally positioned themselves within stages one or perhaps 
two, but there is much less evidence of being ready to shift to stage three, or any certainty that this can 
be achieved without some additional policy support from the government. This issue is also picked up 
again in the concluding commentary.  
 
3. In respect of the role, remit and perspective of the NED, the research has identified that within the 
sector: 
 
a) The unitary board model is considered relevant and beneficial with NEDs emphasising their 
role within the building society sector; 
b) There has been a greater focus on induction and training for NEDs and NEDs are more 
confident in their individual and collective abilities.  
 
Areas of concern are noted and further considerations are: 
 
c) More work may be required in developing understanding beyond the board,  with NEDs 
wishing to emphasise their dual role as both ‘watchdog’ and strategists; 
d) The NED role does appear to be ever more onerous and this may present further challenges 
in terms of future recruitment as well as the potential for NEDs being drawn ever more into 
the business and, perhaps ironically, lose the very ‘independence’ they are there to provide; 
e) There is scope for boards to make use of further external, independent advice both in 
support of board appraisal but also in providing targeted and judicious advice on strategic 
areas and operational review e.g. to Chairs of key committees and to the Senior 
Independent Director (where such a post has been formally recognised).   
 
In discussing the ‘dividend of mutuality’ we raised with NEDs some fundamental issues and discussion 
points about the nature of mutuality, its future competitive strengths and its relevance in the future. 
This has been a long-identified and admired business trait:  
Increasing  
value & sustainability 
Increasing mgmt 
focus & commitment 
Expectation Management 
• Retool value creation 
strategy 
• Liquidity & treasury 
management 
• Opportunistic M&A 
• Revamped credit risk policy 
and reduced volumes 
• Understanding existing risk 
exposures 
• Reacting to reg challenges 
• Managing non exec reactions 
 
• Rejuvenate the branch 
proposition  
• Intermediary relationship 
reassessed 
• Re-pricing and refocus on 
cross selling  
• New products/markets 
assessed 
• Focus on customer 
retention 
• Mortgage fraud 
considered 
• Long term funding 
strategies 
• Strategic bolt on 
acquisitions 
• Outsource / 
offshore 
• “Good bank/bad 
bank” 
 
 
 
Stage 1: 
‘Stabilisation’ 
Stage 2: 
‘Back to Basics’ 
Stage 3: 
‘Redefinition’ 
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‘The special value of mutuality rests in its capacity to establish and sustain relational contract 
structures. These are exemplified in the most successful mutual organisations, which have built 
a culture and an ethos among their employees and customers, which even the best of plc 
structures find difficult to emulate.’37 
 
Those NEDs taking part in the research unanimously expressed a strong affiliation and sentiment 
towards the concept of mutuality (as one might expect!), but with a much less certain or convincing 
view of what that might mean for the future – one respondee noting for instance that  there was as yet 
‘insufficient customer benefit from mutuality’, and another noting that ‘the comforting words of 
politicians and academics about mutuality are of little meaning if that isn’t translated into something of 
meaning to future generations of consumers and, hopefully, [society] members’. Both referred to a need 
to reinvent a meaningful model for mutuality. Put more directly, what does mutuality mean to anyone 
other than those who work within a mutual one, or have a past affinity to one? How does the younger 
consumer relate to such concepts?   
 
Whilst the focus of the research was not specifically on the current and projected strategic position of 
building societies and the building society sector, this is inevitably a primary concern and discussion 
point for many NEDs. On this there seemed to exist a majority feeling that what currently exists is a 
temporary problem facing all financial service institutions and that some return to ‘equilibrium’ will, in 
time, occur. But even if ‘the problems of those building societies that have encountered a decline in 
performance have been predominantly on the property market rather than funding models’38 there 
remains both a short-term and a long-term challenge: short-term in sitting out a potentially protracted 
property down-turn; long-term in reflecting that the pre-recession history for the building society sector 
(as outlined in section 2 earlier) was one of gradual marginalisation against a range of aggressive 
competitors in the financial sector.  
 
We should acknowledge that just as (excessive) risk taking and commercial exuberance is more 
common in a boom, then more extensive pessimism and risk aversion will also be seen in a recession, 
and these latter traits have been seen in some of the responses noted in this report. The expectation 
might then be that the pendulum will swing again. This then becomes central to NEDs seeking to assess 
the balance of risk, and in determining the level of risk aversion and risk acceptance: without some 
significant change the ‘equilibrium position’ for building societies is likely to remain challenging and even 
problematic. A niche position may suit some of the smaller societies: a key opportunity came from the 
local, personal and community focus although, referring back to the mutuality dividend debate, this 
competitive advantage derives from being small and locally responsive, and is not necessarily related 
directly to the mutual business model itself. For the medium and larger organisations a niche position 
may be more difficult or even untenable – a classic Porter39 challenge of being “stuck in the middle” – 
too small for cost advantage but too large and remote from their mutual origins to effectively 
differentiate themselves. 
 
From this view there seems to be a continuing pressure to merge and further rationalise, and even 
during this period of research those pressures have been evidenced in further merger activity. For some 
there is perhaps an inevitable move towards the “Snow White and Seven Dwarfs” scenario one of our 
respondents identified – a sector dominated by the Nationwide with a handful of other major, regionally 
dominant, players together with a rump of much smaller niche actors. Commentary from the BSA40 
would suggest that this may be an exaggerated perspective, with the recent mergers being a ‘downturn’ 
phenomenon, and that there is evidence that Building Societies are ‘bouncing back’ with fewer societies 
recording losses in 2009 compared to 2008.  
 
Either way, the government could provide a real policy lead in reinvigorating the (mutual) building 
society sector. However if this is then restricted to the formation of a reformed government-endorsed 
                                                    
37 Kay J (1991), ‘The Economics of Mutuality’, Annals of Public and Co-operative Economics, Vol 62 (3) pp. 309-318. 
38 Oxford Centre for Mutual and Employee-Owned Business (2009) Converting failed financial institutions into mutual organisations 
BSA p.13 
39 Porter M E (1985) Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. 
40
 Feedback in correspondence, October 2010 
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mutual based on the Northern Rock, the competitive arena might simply intensify rather than radically 
alter for the majority of existing societies. Meanwhile other parties in the property arena may look 
towards alternative solutions to their own policy challenges either through necessity or perhaps strategic 
choice41. 
 
The challenge for building societies, and for NEDs within that sector, is to create and sustain an 
appropriate risk culture and appetite that will enable any such resurrection of the sector to develop and 
flourish: it is to explore opportunities and alternative approaches and solutions that both enhance the 
mutual concept and intention, but meet 21st century customer expectations and competitive challenges.  
 
                                                    
41 A group of housing associations are drawing up plans to launch a £175 million bank to offer shared ownership mortgages: 
Inside Housing October 1st 2010 
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Appendix One: De-Mutualised Societies 
 
 
All of these former building societies no longer exist as independent financial service institutes42  
 
Bradford & Bingley  floated 4 December 2000. Mortgage book nationalised September 2008. Retail 
savings transferred to  Abbey (Banco Santander) September 2008. 
Abbey rebranded to Santander on 11 January 2010. 
Birmingham Midshires taken over by Halifax, April 1999.  Now a division of Lloyds Banking Group. 
Northern Rock  floated 1 October 1997, currently in temporary public ownership. 
Bristol & West taken over by Bank of Ireland, 28 July 1997. Bristol & West transferred its 
branch network and savings business to Britannia Building Society on 21 
September 2005. Britannia became part of The Co-operative Financial Services 
on 1 August 2009. 
Woolwich floated 7 July 1997, taken over by Barclays Bank in October 2000.  Now exists 
only as a trading name of Barclays. 
Halifax  floated 2 June 1997, merged with Bank of Scotland to form HBOS in 2001.  In 
September 2008 Lloyds Bank agreed to take over HBOS. It became part of 
Lloyds Banking Group on 16 January 2009. 
Alliance & Leicester  floated 21 April 1997, acquired by Banco Santander in October 2008. Alliance & 
Leicester is due to be rebranded to Santander in 2010. 
National & Provincial  taken over by Abbey National, 5 August 1996 (ceased trading under this name). 
Cheltenham & 
Gloucester  
taken over by Lloyds Bank, 1 August 1995.  Now exists only as a trading name of 
the Lloyds Banking Group. 
Abbey National  
 
floated 12 July 1989, acquired by Banco Santander  in November 2004. Abbey 
rebranded to Santander on 11 January 2010. 
 
 
 
                                                    
42
 Building Societies Association consumer factsheet – accessed July 10, 2010 
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Appendix Two: Listing of UK Building Societies by Assets43  
 
 
Rank by 
Group 
Assets 
Name of Society Financial Year 
Ended 
Society 
Assets £m 
Group Assets 
£m  
1 Nationwide 04 April 2010 190,497 191,397 
2 Yorkshire (2) 31 December 2009 25,194 22,722 
3 Coventry (4) 31 December 2009 21,037 18,402 
4 Skipton (1, 3) 31 December 2009 15,859 15,569 
− Chelsea (2) 31 December 2009 13,406 13,413 
5 Leeds 31 December 2009 9,556 9,545 
6 West Bromwich 31 March 2010 7,962 8,336 
7 Principality 31 December 2009 6,213 6,219 
8 Newcastle 31 December 2009 4,514 4,620 
9 Norwich & Peterborough 31 December 2009 4,251 4,248 
10 Stroud & Swindon (4) 31 December 2009 2,723 2,737 
11 Nottingham 31 December 2009 2,600 2,600 
12 Kent Reliance (5) 30 September 2009 2,251 2,257 
13 Progressive 31 December 2009 1,664 1,664 
14 Cumberland 31 March 2010 1,576 1,574 
15 National Counties 31 December 2009 1,210 1,246 
16 Manchester 31 December 2009 907 937 
17 Cambridge 31 December 2009 908 904 
18 Furness 31 December 2009 842 843 
19 Saffron 31 December 2009 835 836 
20 Leek United 31 December 2009 735 735 
21 Monmouthshire 30 April 2009 649 650 
22 Hinckley & Rugby 30 November 2009 644 644 
23 Newbury 31 October 2009 629 631 
24 Darlington 31 December 2009 584 583 
25 Ipswich 30 November 2009 462 462 
26 Market Harborough 31 December 2009 416 417 
27 Melton Mowbray 31 December 2009 410 410 
28 Marsden 31 December 2009 356 356 
29 Tipton & Coseley 31 December 2009 350 350 
30 Hanley Economic 31 August 2009 348 349 
31 Scottish 31 January 2010 326 327 
32 Dudley 31 March 2010 313 313 
33 Loughborough 31 October 2009 278 278 
34 Mansfield, The 31 December 2009 274 274 
35 Teachers' 31 December 2009 257 257 
36 Bath Investment 31 December 2009 252 252 
37 Vernon 31 December 2009 246 246 
− Chesham (3) 30 November 2009 231 231 
38 Harpenden 31 December 2009 198 198 
39 Swansea 31 December 2009 182 182 
40 Stafford Railway, The 31 October 2009 175 175 
41 Chorley & District, The 01 February 2010 172 172 
42 Beverley 31 December 2009 165 165 
                                                    
43
 BSA – June 2010 
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43 Buckinghamshire 31 December 2009 158 158 
44 Holmesdale 31 March 2010 152 152 
45 Earl Shilton 31 March 2010 99 99 
46 Ecology, The 31 December 2009 94 94 
47 Shepshed 31 December 2009 93 93 
48 Penrith 31 December 2009 89 89 
49 City of Derry 31 December 2009 38 38 
50 Century 31 December 2009 24 24 
     
The Co-Operative Bank, including Britannia, had total assets of £46,119m as at 31 December 2009 
     
Notes:     
     
(1) Skipton merged with Scarborough BS on 30 March 2009. As at 30/4/08 their Group assets were 
£2,852m 
(2) Chelsea merged with Yorkshire on 1 April 2010.  
(3) Chesham merged with Skipton BS on 1 June 2010. 
(4) The Coventry merged with Stroud &  Swindon on September 1st 2010 
(5) Kent Reliance is currently proposing to re-structure itself as a new industrial and provident society, 
the Kent Reliance Provident Society together with a subsidiary bank, the Kent Reliance Banking Services.  
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Appendix Three: Key Questions for NEDs and the Board 
 
 
 
1. Business model 
 
 Have you envisioned different business models for the future to ensure survival? 
 
2. Mutuality 
 
 How do you articulate the benefits of mutuality for your society in ways which are relevant, 
meaningful and motivating to members and customers? 
 
 How do you monitor and measure that the benefits are still important and relevant to your 
customers? 
 
3. Opportunities 
 
 Do you have a predominant focus on financial risk and is the cautious culture inhibiting growth 
unnecessarily? 
 
 Do you have a plan for when you will you be prepared to take more opportunities and more risk? 
 
 Do you have management information that helps to focus attention on opportunities as well as 
risk? 
 
 Can you quantify the long term risk of missing business opportunities now? 
 
 How have you planned to develop internal skills to lead in more innovative and imaginative ways 
if the “old market” does not return? 
 
4.  Board and NEDs 
 
 Do you have succession plans that reflect the need for a diverse board that reflects all 
stakeholders and areas of risk? 
 
 Do you remunerate adequately to reflect the change in responsibility and time commitments for 
NEDs? 
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